# 2AC

#### Turns the K-

#### Nuclear energy is essential to quality of life issues that disproportionately affect minority communities

American Association of Blacks in Energy 2002 May, 1 pg. 1 “American Association of Blacks in Energy Supports Yucca Mountain Storage Repository” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/nuclearwastedisposal/regulatoryinformation/aabenewsrelease5102 >

At its quarterly meeting last month, the Board of Directors of the American Association of Blacks in Energy announced its support for Congressional ratification of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the logical site for nuclear waste storage. “Careful and diligent monitoring is key to ensuring public health and safety, but that can be better accomplished at one site instead of continuing the current practice of on-site storage. The Yucca Mountain project is an important component in a solid energy policy which ensures energy and environmental equity for all Americans,” said Frank Johnson, chairman of the association. In related action, the organization reaffirmed its support for re-licensing of nuclear facilities. “Nuclear is America’s largest base-load, emission-free electricity. Minority communities are commonly found in urban areas that require large amounts of electricity for public transportation, hospitals, water treatment facilities and other necessities. We believe that nuclear energy provides important benefits”, said Johnson. “Our quality of life depends upon electricity that is reliable and affordable – and nuclear is an important part of the mix,” he said. AABE is a national association of energy professionals founded and dedicated to ensure the input of African Americans and other minorities into the discussion and development of energy policies, regulations, R&D technologies and environmental issues.

The alt fails-

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Totalizing critiques of whiteness commodify races- essentialisms ensure no alt solvency

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, fromracialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

#### Frontal assaults on whiteness can’t unseat racist systems of thought- Categorically rejected by the adaptive unconscious

Berklak 2009 (Ann Berlak, Elementary Education Program, San Fransisco State University, 2009, “Challenging the Hegemony of Whiteness by Addressing the Adaptive Unconscious,” in Undoing Whiteness in the Classroom)

(p50-1) The theory of the adaptive unconscious they set out suggested a new way to think about making the power and privilege of whiteness visible. The central idea of the theory is that we have two non-redundant information processing systems that are relatively independent of one another. These two systems have evolved in different ways and serve different functions. One of these, the adaptive unconscious, operates almost entirely out of conscious view. The adaptive unconscious is far more sophisticated, efficient, and adult-like than the unconscious portrayed by psychoanalytic theory. It can set goals, interpret and evaluate evidence, and influence judgments, conscious feelings, and behavior. People can think in quite sophisticated ways and yet be thinking "non-consciously." In fact, the mind relegates a good deal of high-level thinking to the adaptive unconscious. Wilson calls it the adaptive unconscious because it has evolved to enable human survival. It permits us to notice danger and respond to it quickly. Gladwell compares the adaptive unconscious to a giant computer that crunches all the data from all the experiences we have had. These efficient, sophisticated, unconscious information-processing systems that select, interpret, and evaluate incoming information, direct our attention, and filter our experience influence almost all our second-by-second responses. Thus, the adaptive unconscious is more influential in our day-by-day living than most of us think, and we exert less control over our actions than we imagine. Attitudes toward concepts such as race or gender, for example, operate at two levels—at a conscious level our stated values direct our behavior deliberately, and at an unconscious level we respond in terms of immediate but quite complex automatic associations that tumble out before we have even had time to think. The adaptive unconscious is unintentional, effortless, and responsive to the here and now. It is also rigid; that is, it is slow to respond to new and contradictory information. Conscious thought takes a longer view; it is controlled, slow, and effortful. The idea is that we have two personality systems: the adaptive unconscious and the conscious self. As exemplified by Katie, each has characteristic and sometimes diametrically opposed ways of interpreting the environment and its own feelings and motives that guide behavior. Many studies have documented that the disconnect between the conscious intentions of people like Katie and the unconscious views that motivate their behavior is ubiquitous (e.g. Ferguson, 2000; Lewis, 2004). So independent are the two systems that Gladwell characterizes the snap judgments or rapid cognitions characteristic of the adaptive unconscious as taking place behind a locked door. Thus, individuals can honestly claim they are aware of the diverse set of racist practices that hold in place the hegemony of whiteness and yet be completely unaware of them at an implicit automatic level. People may act on their conscious views when they are behaving deliberately but act on the more unconscious dispositions of their adaptive unconscious when they are not monitoring their actions.

#### Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the US and the world- Must evaluate consequences

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, ‘3 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

¶ A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,¶ dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than¶ coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution¶ of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not¶ exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young¶ Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning¶ the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel¶ Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase¶ ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and¶ ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to¶ this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and¶ farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less¶ consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. ¶ Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national¶ security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national¶ interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,¶ the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and¶ the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined¶ with energy concerns.¶ The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges¶ of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in¶ America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative¶ approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly¶ about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and¶ nuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate for¶ the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy¶ dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to¶ the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the¶ environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,¶ not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.¶ U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security¶ posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global¶ environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion¶ of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern¶ energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed¶ for economic advancement is a deep concern.¶ None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty¶ can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term¶ initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.¶ The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted¶ policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,¶ perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition¶ that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy¶ interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this¶ ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment¶ of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that¶ can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

#### We have a better explanation for violence-

#### Whiteness cant be the root cause- history of other races justifying violence based on racialization

Spickard 2009 Paul Spickard, Graduated Harvard, Ph.D in History from UC Berkeley, professor of history at UC Santa Barbara, review of “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, in American Studies, vol 5 num 1/2, MUSE

For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment.

#### Violence is objectively decreasing due to western reason and liberal democracy- spreading those ideals is key to solve conflict

Pinker 2011 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

With all its wars, murder and genocide, history might suggest that the taste for blood is human nature. Not so, argues Harvard Prof. Steven Pinker. He talks to WSJ's Gary Rosen about the decline in violence in recent decades and his new book, "The Better Angels of Our Nature." But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### Best studies prove global capitalism creates virtuous interdependence

Hegre et al 2009 (H’vard Hegre, Professor of Political Science @University of Oslo, , John R. Oneal, Professor of Political Science @ The University of Alabama, Bruce Russett, Professor of Political Science @ Yale University) August 25, 2009 “Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict” http://www.yale-university.com/leitner/resources/docs/HORJune09.pdf

Liberals expect economically important trade to reduce conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or contemporaneously. Keshk, Reuveny, & Pollins (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) report on the basis of simultaneous analyses of these reciprocal relations that conflict impedes trade but trade does not deter conflict. Using refined measures of geographic proximity and size—the key elements in the gravity model of international interactions—reestablishes support for the liberal peace, however. Without careful specification, trade becomes a proxy for these fundamental exogenous factors, which are also important influences on dyadic conflict. KPR‘s and KR‘s results are spurious. Large, proximate states fight more and trade more. Our re-analyses show that, as liberals would expect, commerce reduces the risk of interstate conflict when proximity and size are properly modeled in both the conflict and trade equations. We provided new simultaneous estimates of liberal theory using Oneal & Russett‘s (2005) data and conflict equation and a trade model derived from Long (2008). These tests confirm the pacific benefit of trade. Trade reduces the likelihood of a fatal militarized dispute, 1950–2000 in our most comprehensive analysis, as it does in the years 1984-97 when additional measures of traders‘ expectations of domestic and interstate conflict are incorporated (Long, 2008) and in the period 1885-2000. This strong support for liberal theory is consistent with Kim‘s (1998) early simultaneous estimates, Oneal, Russett & Berbaum‘s (2003) Granger-style causality tests, and recent research by Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007). Reuveny & Kang (1998) and Reuveny (2001) report mixed results. It is particularly encouraging that, when simultaneously estimated, the coefficient of trade in the conflict equation is larger in absolute value than the corresponding value in a simple probit analysis. Thus, the dozens of published articles that have addressed the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace—as virtually all have done since 1999—have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Admittedly, our instrumental variables are not optimal. In some cases, for example, in violation of the identification rule, the creation or end of a PTA may be a casus belli. More importantly, neither of our instruments explains a large amount of variance. Thus, future research should be directed to identifying better instruments. Our confidence in the commercial peace does not depend entirely on the empirical evidence, however; it also rests on the logic of liberal theory. Our new simultaneous estimates—as well as our re-analyses of KPR and KR—indicate that fatal disputes reduce trade. Even with extensive controls for on-going domestic conflict, militarized disputes with third parties, and expert estimates of the risks of such violence, interstate conflict has an adverse contemporaneous effect on bilateral trade. This is hardly surprising (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Reuveny, 2001; Li & Sacko, 2002; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Glick & Taylor, 2005; Kastner, 2007; Long, 2008; Findlay & O‘Rourke, 2007; cf. Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Blomberg & Hess, 2006; and Ward & Hoff, 2007). If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. Because conflict is costly, trade should reduce interstate violence. Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. Whether paid prospectively or contemporaneously, the economic cost of conflict should reduce the likelihood of military conflict, ceteris paribus, if national leaders are rational.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Your explicit focus black academia flips the poles – if our scholarship is flawed because of its narrow focus then yours is too

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 51-4

Under the Cult of Separatism, expressions of mainstream culture considered “default” by most Americans of all colors are processed by many if not most blacks not as common coin, but as “white.” This alienates may black people from some of the most well-wrought, emotionally stirring art and ideas that humans have produced, miring the race in a parochialism that clips its spiritual wings. On a lunch date with a young black woman some time ago, I happened to be carrying a copy of Jane Eyre. For whatever its worth, at any give time I am likely to be reading Alice Walker or Gloria Naylor as Charlotte Bronte or Henry James; I read Tolstroy not out of a self-hating fascination with white people, but because the man wrote a crackling good and highly affecting story. (Anna Karenina so grabbed me that one day when I was reading it in Washington Square, the woman next to me said, “oh, look, there are Anna and Vronsky over there” and I looked up fully expecting to see them gliding by the skateboarders and drug dealers in their bourgeois finery, so real had they become to me.) However, for my black friend, Jane Eyre was not a book, it was a “white book.” “Oh, I’d never read something like that,” she said, quite casually. She preferred to read only books written by and about her own people. That includes a lot of great literature but the person who can immerse himself in the richness of James Baldwin but never experiences Tolstoy is like someone who thrills to a Haydn string quartet but refuses to hear one not of a Beethoven symphony. This person never tastes the whole meal. Yet as I have already said to often, Life Isn’t Perfect, and in terms of the world in general, none of us ever gets the whole meal. This woman will live a full life despite missing out on “white” novels. But often this perspective ends up selling out black Americans. For example, there is a magnificent complete three-CD recording of the original score of the musical Show Boat. It is marred at the beginning, however, when what is supposed to be a black chorus of stevedores sing stiffly with slightly British accents. This was a last-minute emergency measure. Show Boat was the first American musical to substantially address the tragedy of race relations, and includes a black chorus and a white chorus. Fittingly, a black chorus was hired for the recording, but walked out upon being required to sing the original lyrics of the opening chorus “Niggers all work on the Mississippi.” The recording was made in London, and while using American performers, had recruited a British white chorus. On such short notice, the producers had no choice but to have them step in to sing the black choruses as well. The accent difference is not a serious problem in the passages for the white chorus, but it naturally stands out much more when these Britishers are supposed to be deep Southern blacks. Over the years, the lyric in question has indeed been increasingly watered down for new productions in line with increasing racial sensitivity: “Darkies all work…,” “Colored folks work…,” and finally, “here we all work…” by the 1960s. this made sense, but by 1988, with nigger safely quarantined as one of the most socially inappropriate words in the English language to use in real life, the producers thought that singing the original lyric could be perceived as historical in intent, and furthermore, the original line had a true-to-life power that none of the substitutions have. The “Niggers all work on the Mississippi…” line is sung not by a happy gang of minstrels, but by grim, overworked black laborers bitterly quoting whites’ opinions of them; it is also an accurate depiction of the tendency for blacks to use nigger among themselves. Whether one calls this a therapeutic defusing of an epithet via appropriation, or evidence of underlying self-hatred (it is in truth both), the fact is that this use of nigger is undeniably real. It is difficult to believe that anyone who actually watches a production of Show boat, seeing how openly and sympathetically it treats the black condition, could fail to understand that the blacks singing this opening chorus “Niggers all work on the Mississippi” are eloquently protesting racism, not underlining it. This opening chorus portrays blacks giving vent to their frustration at their victimhood, surely something these protesters would champion. The only possible reasons someone would misunderstand this lyric is, quite simply, not having had occasion to listen to a recording, see a production, or rent a video. One suspects that these singers were only glancingly familiar with Show Boat, out of a sense that it is a “white musical” – “oh, I’d never go see anything like that.” As a result, they pass up an opportunity to lend one of black American cultures most precious legacies, the unique timbre and precision of choral singing, to this monumental recording, instead leaving our ancestors portrayed by British whites unable to render the material in the authentic style. This sense of mainstream culture as alien extends into academia as well. Manning Marable has explicitly urged black scholars to restrict their research to black issues, thereby explicitly deeming intellectual curiosity for its own sake to be inappropriate to black American people. Under this rubric, the black scholar is to study slavery, Africa, and social welfare, but never Russian history, Jane Eyre, or mainstream theater history. Many will see Marable as “concerned,” a “serious brother,” or “cool,” but obviously it is a short step from Marable to “oh, id never read that” and the Show Boat walkout. Separatism also has a tendency to close black people off to foreign cultures other than black ones. I once met an aspiring black linguist who had spent two years in China without learning Chinese beyond what he needed to buy food at the market. Most people who spend two years in a foreign country come back speaking the language, and this is especially true of linguists, for whom the experience often serves as a basis for career’s work. This was the only linguist I have ever met who spent two years abroad without becoming bilingual, and it is not likely to be accidental that he was black. Seperatism has a way of discouraging black Americans from learning foreign languages other than French and Spanish, spoken by many Caribbeans and Africans, and Swahili. In my lifetime, I have known only one black person who studied German (it was a required course), one (a Black Muslim) who took Arabic, and not one who took Russian, Chinese, or Japanese. Certainly there must have been some who studied the latter three (e.g, black political adviser Condoleza Rice speaks Russian). Nevertheless, it is significant that in a thirty-four-year language-centered life, I personally have never met any. What makes black people shy away form these languages – even in elite universities – is a sense that they are not “black” things. This particular branch of Separatist orientation has roots in segregation, of course, and was crystallized in the sixties as Separatism expanded into a general coping strategy. Now, however, this wariness of nonblack culture is too often a barrier sealing the black community off from enriching influences. The linguist wanted to go on to do academic study of the Chinese sound system, but he will never be competitive – almost every other linguist studying Chinese has learned to speak the language.

#### You should hold their arguments to rigorous logical standards and not simply dismiss our evidence as ‘just another link’

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 54-5

As the spawn of Victimology, Separatism shares with its progenitor a tendency to be allowed to trump truth in cases that require choosing between them. In this vein, a considerable amount of black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem. Mother Egypt “Afrocentric History,” for example, is primarily founded upon a fragile assemblage of misreadings of classical texts to construct a scenario under which Ancient Egypt was a “black” civilization (was Anwar Sadat a “brother”?), raped by the Ancient Greeks, who therefore owed all notable in their culture to them. Professional classicists easily point out the errors in these claims, only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers. Indeed, to insist upon facts – or apparently, to master the complex classical languages in which the original documents were written – is “inauthentic.” The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,” like “creation scientists” whose objectivity is decisively crippled by a fundamental conviction that God must be the driver of the universe. Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people may be many wonderful things, but one thing they are not is scholars. Yet they are respectfully addressed as “professor” by gullible students, and one eminent black undergraduate profiled in Ebony cited a volume of this kind of history as the most important book she had read that year. Ideally, an afrocentric academia is conceivable in which people simply apply the tools of the mainstream academia to illuminating black concerns. This is the vision most defenses of Afrocentric work are based on. However, in practice, the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal. All too often, black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but a subset of this: Chronicling black victimhood past and present, and to remedy that victimhood, celebration and legitimization of black people past and present. Because black people are no more perfect than anyone else and life past and present is complex, this abridged conception of academic inquiry inherently conflicts with the commitment to mainstream academia to striving for assessment as unbiased as possible. In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia – articles, books, conferences, symposia – are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. In “black” academia, as often as not, comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation, and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than the empirical soundness of ones conclusions. There are certainly quite a few excellent black scholars, but overall, Separatist academic standards are pervasive enough to make black conferences quite often perceptibly less rigorous than mainstream ones. Many mainstream scholars would be, or have been, surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences, unaware that because of the grips of victimology and separatism, this kind of debate would be superfluous to the proceedings, and even unwelcome. After four decades, many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and as such, have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but the very politest and most superficial of criticism. Here is the beginnings of the notions at the center of “Afrocentric History” such as that Cleopatra was “black,” that Aristotle stole books from an Egyptian library that wasn’t even built until twenty-five years after he died, etc. Moderate black academics are more likely to say of the most egregious Afrocentric work that “more work needs to be done” than to actually pin it as nonsense, which makes complete sense when we realize that the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem

#### Their cooption arguments are unsupported and nonfalsifiable – don’t buy their rhetorically powerful cards – force them to provide specific applications of their abstract evidence.

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 55-8

This problem is by no means limited just to the collection of people committed to “afrocentric history”’ it is seldom far from the surface in any scholarly setting in the realm of “blackademia.” As a conference on black performance in 1999, a black scholar from England argued that whites’ tendency to adopt black American popular cultural forms is evidence not of an identification with black people, nor of a desire for cross-cultural harmony or understanding, but of a desire to eliminate the black presence via co-opting what makes them unique. Interesting idea, but hardly as obvious or incontrovertible as the operations of gravity. Does the white teen who like Snoop Doggy Dogg want to eliminate niggers, or does he simply like the beat and vibrate in tune with the antiestablishment attitude that has enthralled young Westerners since Goethe’s Young Werther? Did whites stir the blues and jazz into their marches and jigs to create rock music because they were racists, or because blues and jazz are among the most sublimely intoxicating aesthetic creations humanity has ever known Here in the Bay Area, I have noticed that white females of ages roughly ten to fourteen are fond of imitating black women’s “sassy” “uh-UHH!...” accompanied by the pushing forward of an admonishing second finger pointing upwards, and waved back and forth in opposition to corresponding “sassy swivel” neck movements (tough to describe on paper – thing of Aretha Franklin in The Blues Brothers). Perhaps I lack some exotic brand of insight, but I simply do not see sublimated hate in these girls – on the contrary, they are expressing a joyous admiration of black women’s trademark strength; it’s the melting pot in all of its glory. Similarly, among the white male high schoolers and undergraduates I see who perform hip-hop, imitating “ghetto” gestures and intonation as closely as they can, what I see is a sincere admiration of a massively compelling art form. A lot of these kids will even say “sometimes I wish I was black” – and I do not think that what they wish is that they could become black while real black people disappeared; what they wish – regardless of the fact that this would of course be more complicated than a fantasy dwells upon – is to join black people. Some might disagree with me, but just as many would not, and the point is that there are obviously issues to be discussed here. Yet the scholar at this conference simply put forth his declaration that this kind of imitation masks racist hatred without a shred of support. To be sure, his point was rendered especially seductive by the densely elegant jargon in which academics in the humanities are trained to couch their thoughts. Furthermore, this was all delivered in a gorgeous Oxonian accent which, in all of its calfskin suave, also betrayed that he is extremely unlikely to have experience nay of the particular slings and arrows of a black American inner-city, or even middle-class, life. In general, there was not a hint of anything but Sir Alec Guinness in his demeanor, and thus his statement cannot be informed by any personal discomfort with seeing “his” culture “co-opted.” Indeed, put aside his references to “mimesis” and “negation,” and all this guy was saying was “the only reason they imitate us is because they hate us.” Preface this statement with “Yo,” and its content remains exactly the same. Yet if “imitation is the sincerest form of flattery” has any value as a general aphorism, his was in essence an extremely underargued thesis. Mainstream conferences are devoted not to tossing out colorful accusations, but to sifting and evaluating the idea proposed by the participants. Yet despite this man’s having presented no evidence or argument whatsoever to support his claim, he was heartily applauded several times, and was one of the hits of the conference – he could barely get out of the auditorium for coffee, so besieged was he by people lauding him for telling it like it is. (No, I was not jealou – I was just attending the conference, not speaking at it!) Because this was a black conference, making an argument was less important than reaffirming common wisdom, and to hear common wisdome dressed up in arcane words and an Alistair Cooke accent is even better, in lending it the air of scholarly authority. The substance of scholarly authority, however, was a distinctly lesser concern. What was significant about this was that for anyone to ask this man to supply evidence for this point would have been as shockingly inappropriate as pullout a tuba and blowing on it. His point was simply assumed to be true, or at least, by the more exploratorily inclined, “a valid point of view.” But what this meant was that this was not a forum devoted to the presenting findings or evaluating conflicting interpretations of data or events – i.e., properly speaking it was not an academic exercise at all. It was a rally, designed to reinforced the emotionally based sentiments the audience and participants came in with. After all, even if the man was right, mainstream academia is not inclined to convene conferences with the purpose of proclaiming what is already known. Political science conferences do not feature various speakers presenting nimble variations upon the point that “war is bad”’ biologists do not convene to urgently remind one another that all forms of life are based on DNA. The Separatist current makes this kind of thing seem natural to conveners of many black conferences, out of a sense that actual academic debate is somehow “besides the point” for Africna Americans since our status as eternal victims make our regularly proclaiming this, as it would be for villagers in Chechnya, a more pressing concern. And make no mistake – the same priorities reign even without plumy accents and Judith Butler jargon. I once attended a conference where a black woman gave a paper taking issue with an article which, by her reading, denied that black female speech had any unique patterns. After criticizing the author, with the unspoken implication that this writer was one ore oppressor trying to deny black people their identity, the professor presented a few features of black female speech. In the question session afterwards, a white woman very politely pointed out that the author of the article in question was quite aware of the uniqueness and richness of black female speech, and that the professor’s interpretation was based on a misreading of the author’s phrasing. Ordinarily in academia, the presenter would defend herself by making specific reference to the article and its argumentation. Here, however, was a conflict between the tenets of mainstream academia and the very different ones in black academia. The professor’s sole answer was, “well, I read it as denying the uniqueness of black female speech, and that was my interpretation.” Period. It did not appear to even occur to her that an actual address of the issue might be germane. Unlike mainstream academics who come to a conference prepared to field criticism during question sessions, she considered herself to have done her job simply by presenting the list of black female speech traits – and at a black conference, she had. Indeed, her presentation was constructed not as a reasoned demonstration but as a backyard “calling-out” of the author in the name of injured pride. She opened by reading a passage form the author’s paper and then repeating it in a challenging intonation of mock disbelief, with friends in the audience assigned to shout back the phrase in the same tone of voice to evoke the black church’s call-and-response tradition; she then did this with two more phrases. This was cute, but couching an academic paper as a prelude to a ghetto catfight renders one’s presentation inherently immune to constructive discussion. To criticize it in any way, even politely, is to question not the lines of argument, but an expression of cultural identity – and thus the person themselves. Indeed, the professor’s set jaw at being questioned made it painfully clear that any further dwelling upon the point would be processed as a slight against her and her race, and the questioner has hip enough to intuit the conflict in traditions here and dutifully sit down.

#### Methodological criticisms of our evidence base on the institutionalized nature of race does not warrant simply ignoring it -

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

Various sorts of criticism have been directed at the validity of Foster's work. Some is substantive in character, in other words it consists of a questioning of his claims on the basis of appeals to what is taken to be well-known from other sources. For example, critics sometimes rely on the findings of other research to throw doubt on the validity of Foster's conclusions. Thus, Connolly comments that the fact that Foster's findings challenge he growing" perceived wisdom" of a number of research and theoretical perspectives developed since the mid 1980s (. . .) raises numerous important issues concerning the study's political, ethical and theoretical orientation and, consequently, the research methods used.6 Accompanying these substantive criticisms, very often, are methodological criticisms: these question the inferences that Foster draws on the basis of his own or others' data. For instance, both Connolly and Gillborn and Drew challenge Foster's claim that there was little evidence of racism on the part of the teachers in the school he studied, on the grounds that he took insufficient account of black students' views.7 They argue that he explains away the unsolicited complaints of teacher racism voiced by three of the students he interviewed by treating these as products of a general anti-school attitude. The critics also argue that the fact that so few of the students reported the existence of teacher racism resulted from the influence on them of Foster's own status as a white middle class male whom they identified with the teachers. Another methodological criticism that has been made of Foster's study is that the school he investigated was atypical and therefore does not constitute a sound basis for generalisation to other schools.8 Interestingly, these methodological criticisms parallel in character, if not in force, those that Foster himself makes of other studies; indeed, of many of the studies on which his critics rely in their substantive criticisms. And he, and others, have responded to the attacks of the critics with further methodological arguments.9 What we have here, then, is a body of substantive and methodological arguments which are interpreted in conflicting ways by Foster and his critics. One response to this situation might be to call for further research designed to resolve the disagreement. I would not want to discourage this, but I doubt whether it would succeed. It seems to me that the roots of the disagreement lie more deeply than these substantive and methodological criticisms themselves. We get an inkling of this from the fact that Foster's critics sometimes combine such criticisms with what I will call meta-methodological arguments. These concerned effects in what they take to be the presuppositions n the basis of which Foster approached his own data and that of others. The clearest published example of such criticism is provided by Connolly. He argues that, as a result of his adoption of a Weberian orientation, Foster was unable to recognise the racism that was taking place 'under his nose' (p. 142) in the school he studied. Connolly sees Foster's work in terms of a deterministic model of research in which the findings are constrained by his starting assumptions, in such a way as to rule out the detection of many forms of racism. Gillborn and Drew hint at the same point, criticizing Foster's definition of racism as too narrow. l l In part, what seems to be implied in these arguments is that the evidence which Foster offers in his study, and his questioning of the findings of other studies, must be rejected because they are incompatible with the widely accepted theory that racism is institutionalized in British society, that it is part of the fundamental structure of that society on this basis his critics argue that while discrimination may not seem to be occurring in some particular setting, once we view this setting in the context of British (or English) society as a whole it will be seen to form part of a larger pattern of racism. So, here Foster's claims are being questioned on the grounds of his presumed commitment to an inadequate methodological framework, one which gives a misleading priority of micro-empirical evidence at the expense of macro-theoretical perspective. This can be summarised as the charged that Foster's work is empiricist1.2 And, of course this argument connects with much discussion of the methodology of qualitative research today, in which the empiricism of quantitative research, and of some qualitative work, is challenged on the basis of alternative epistemological ssumptions.l3 What is being rejected here can be more usefully (because more specifically) referred to as a foundationalist epistemology. This is the notion that research conclusions are founded, in some rigorously determinate fashion, on a body of evidence whose own validity is beyond question (for example, because it consists of reports of intersubjectively observable behaviour). Thus, Troyna criticizes Foster for 'methodological purism', which he interprets as requiring evidence that rules out all possible alternative interpretations.l4 Foundationalism has, of course, been subjected to very damaging criticism in philosophy, as well as in the social sciences, over the past 30 or 40 years, and I think it is clear that it is not defensible. There is no single, agreed alternative to foundationalism, but we can identify three radical alternatives that have become increasingly influential in social research in recent years; and whose influence is detectable in the writings of some of Foster's critics. These alternatives are: relativism, standpoint theory, and instrumentalism. These are not always clearly distinguished, and they are sometimes used in combination. However, I will try to show that none of them is very satisfactory. Applying relativism to the case under discussion, it would be argued that the validity of Foster's appeal to the canons of good research is relative to a particular methodological framework, namely positivism or post-positivism and that other frameworks would produce different conclusions. We may, for instance, decide to treat the claims of some black pupils that they and others have been subjected to racist treatment by teachers as necessarily true in their own terms, as reflecting their experience and the framework of assumptions that constitute it, that framework being incommensurable with the one adopted by Foster. Something like this may underlie Connolly's question: 'how can Foster as a White middle class male construct his own definition of racism to then use to judge the accuracy of Black working class students definitions?"5If treated as valid, this argument has the effect of apparently undercutting Foster's empirical research in the sense that it need no longer be treated by others as representing reality. Yet, at the same time, from this point of view Foster's arguments remain valid in their own terms; in fact, they remain as valid as those of his critics. This seems to lead to a sort of stalemate. And, of course, there is the problem that relativism is self-undermining: if it is true, then in its own terms it can only be true relative to a relativist framework; so that from other points of view it remains false.'6 As a non-relativist, this leaves Foster free to claim quite legitimately( even from the point of view of relativism) that his views represent reality, whereas a relativist critic could not make the same claim for her or his views but must treat them simply as representing a particular framework of beliefs to which he or she happens to be committed. The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women’s emancipation. l9 However, while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.20

#### Our evidence should be preferred over their propaganda tactics – you should not ignore or reject our evidence because it doesn’t directly address institutionalized racism

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

This is not to say that practitioners, such as 'anti-racist' educators, should simply ignore the findings of research. The point is rather that they should judge those findings in relation to their own practical knowledge and according to what is required to pursue their work well. On this basis it might be quite reasonable for 'anti-racists to continue with their campaign against racism among teachers despite the doubts that Foster has raised; though they would be foolish to completely ignore those doubts. All this said, the criticisms of Foster's work do not seem to derive primarily from such practical judgments about his findings. Many of them seem more motivated by a concern with its possible propaganda consequences: not only can Foster's work not be used to support the 'anti-racist' campaign against teacher racism, it could be used by the other side. Indeed, it seems to be suspected by some of the critics that Foster is working for the opposition. The key question, for some at least, is 'whose side are we on?'.44 I do not doubt that propaganda considerations are necessary ones for practitioners engaged in political activity to take into account. While in an ideal world, perhaps, disputes would be resolved on the basis of discussion in pursuit of the truth, it is clear I think that the world we live in is very far from that ideal. However, great danger arises if propaganda concerns come to outweigh other practical concerns. In these circumstances, practical activity is likely to fail because erroneous assumptions accumulate; and its failure may do widespread damage. It would be a mistake, then, it seems to me, for 'anti-racists to dismiss Foster's work. To the extent that it throws doubt on the accuracy of some of the assumptions on which they operate, they ought to consider its validity seriously and not simply ignore, reject or even try to suppress it.45I t may point to a necessary reconstruction of 'anti-racism' This might be required if it were true that racism on the part of British teachers was not widespread or that it did not play a significant role in the generation of 'racial' inequality. Accepting this would not involve a denial that there may be features of the British education system and society that generate the under achievement of black pupils. Indeed, Foster himself suggests one mechanism for this: the allocation of black pupils to schools that are less effective educationally.46Of course, there still remains the question of what level or sort of evidence should persuade 'anti-racists' that Foster is right. I do not want to speculate about this here, merely to point out that there should be some level of confirming evidence at which 'anti-racists' would accept this argument. And even if Foster does not provide that level of evidence, his work could be accepted by them as making a potential contribution to increasing the effectiveness of their activities.47I n my view these considerations should outweigh any negative propaganda effects that Foster's work is likely to have. After all, racists have seldom found it difficult to invent arguments and evidence to support their position, and have generally shown scant regard for the difference between such inventions and more soundly based scientific conclusions. I want to conclude by going even further than this and suggesting that 'anti-racists' are unwise to reject the conventional model of research in favour of an activist conception. One reason for this is that the propaganda capacity of research is to a large extent parasitic upon the conventional model. Once research becomes seen as geared to the pursuit of particular political goals, with research results being selected, even in part, according to their suitability for propaganda purposes, its propaganda value is gone.

#### The argument that their claims are constructed to protect normative legal that are false – this is a non-falsifiable conspiracy – their paranoid mode of though makes effective politics impossible.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 166-7.

Radical multiculturalists tend to take a similar posture with respect to outsiders. Either the criticism is another effort by members of the dominant group to maintain their status and power, or it is pandering by members of the oppressed group to the power structure. Even outsiders who purport to be sympathetic to the radical multiculturalists position may be viewed with suspicion – they may be co-opting the radical potential of the movement. Indeed, once you take the position that truth and merit are masks for the exercise of power, there really isn’t any way to consider an argument expect as an attempted exercise of power. So the natural response is not to ask whether the argument is valid, but instead to look for the right tactical response to the hostile move. In addition, it becomes almost impossible to conceive of friendly criticism; to admit that the critic is honestly motivated by a concern about the truth of your own position would be to concede that “truth” is something other than a mask for power. If truth and merit do not exist, concerns about the truth or merit of work by multiculturalists can only be yet another power play. Moreover, as we have already discussed, radical multiculturalists like paranoids, can explain away any seemingly adverse evidence, because they know in advance that it cannot be valid. The paranoid knows that there is a conspiracy against him, and if there is evidence to the contrary, that only proves the power and deviousness of the conspiracy. Similarly, the radical multiculturalists can always deconstruct any apparently contrary evidence. The research agenda, after all, is not to test whether society is irredeemably racist and sexist but to uncover precisely how society is shaped by racism and sexism. Counter-evidence only increases the challenge. The paranoid mode of thought is a threat to efforts at dialogue between radical multiculturalists and others. Combined with the self-sealing nature of social constructionism and its reliance on stockries of oppression, it makes genuine intellectual engagement with outsiders difficult. Nevertheless, as we discuss in our “Conclusion,” prospects are not utterly hopeless. Something constructive may yet emerge from the clash between the radical multiculturalists and the mainstream.

#### We are rational human subjects - Knowledge is objective – we can use our understanding of our shared reality to make decisions – MAKE THEM PROVE WE ARE WRONG.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 27

At least since the Enlightenment, knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective. Something counts as knowledge of because of its pedigree but because of its content. That the Pope or the president or the New York Times says it does not insulate it from challenge. Moreover, you and I can know the same thing. We can convey that knowledge to others, and we can be persuaded through reason to reassess what we know. Some things even count as -common knowledge." Objectivity is a tricky concept. (Ask any philosopher.) In using the term objective knowledge, we have in mind something more modest :han eternal, unchanging truth, or what philosophers sometimes call the God's-eye view of the universe. Knowledge as understood at any riven time is not necessarily the same as ultimate truth. We someimes think we "know" things that seem well-established but turn out not to be true, as when everyone knew that the sun revolved around the earth, or that chocolate caused hyperactivity in children. These things have since been disproved, and we now have knowledge of—or at least a very well-justified belief in—their converses. Knowledge is nevertheless objective in the sense that it reflects something bevond fiat or a parochial viewpoint. We would, for instance, tend to discount an unsupported statement by the chocolate industry denying any relationship between chocolate and hyperactivity. This is because we generally believe that there are independent standards for evaluating claims to knowledge and for mounting challenges to established knowledge. Moreover, these standards are crucial to our common vision of knowledge as both objective and subject to change. What keeps knowledge from being stagnant is its universal vulnerability to challenge. Objectivity is the aspiration to eliminate beliefs based on bias, personal idiosyncracy, fiat, or careless investigation.